Culture and Observation in the Study of
Economic Systems
Carsten Herrmann-Pillath
University
of Witten/Herdecke, Germany, Department of Business Economics, Institute for
Comparative Research into Culture and Economic Systems
phone +49-2302-926-572
fax +49-2302-926-571
e-mail chepi@uni-wh.de
Abstract
In
recent years the concept of “culture” has been revived in order to understand
differences in the institutional set-up and performance of economic systems. At
the same time, scholars increasingly adopt a cognitive science approach. On
closer scrutiny, however, culture is shown to be either redundant or leading
into serious paradoxa of self-reference in scientific analysis, if the concept
is related to cognitive schemes and/or informal institutions. This is also
valid in case of attempts at treating culture as a black box by means of
relying exclusively on “culture free” data (for example, data on international
trade). Therefore I propose to define culture as a “pattern” (of cognitive
schemes or informal institutions) that is not directly accessible to
observation, but can be conceived of as emergent property of the relation between
observer and observed object, like the economic system. Based on a detailed
description of that process of observation I sketch a specific strategy for
empirical research. Here, culture becomes an hypothesis of the scientific
observer that is based on observing the observation of culture.
Culture
and Observation in the Study of Economic Systems
1.
Culture: a measure of our ignorance, jack of all trades, or what?
Culture, a surprising event
There
seems to be a strong correlation between the use of „culture“ in research on
economic systems and the difficulties of explaining their ongoing institutional
change and performance. Researchers refer the more frequently to the concept of
culture, the more surprises emerge in their field of investigation that cannot
be explained by the general theories at hand, and when actual developments
display highly singular charachteristics. For example, in recent analyses of
the experience with transition in Central and East European economies the
puzzle has been noticed that similar policies have led to highly diversified outcomes.
In particular, there seems to be a systematic difference between Central
European and Eastern European countries which could be related to a different
historical background and which fits remarkably well to the historical
borderline between catholic (pre-reformation) and orthodox religious
communities. Hence, the hypothesis is adduced that a different cultural
heritage influences institutional changes.[1]
In a similar vein, the surprising “miracle” of East Asian growth had been
related to a common Confucian heritage by many observers even in the context of
standard growth analysis because that heritage seems to influence the speed of
human capital formation.
Of
course, the example of transition also illustrates the immense difficulties in
applying the concept of culture. On the one hand, at closer scrutiny we realize
immediately that there are substantial differences in government behavior and
in the politics of transition, as for example when comparing the Russian and
Polish performance supposedly both resulting from a similar shock therapy
(Frye/Shleifer, 1997). Furthermore, even if there is a certain correlation
between cultural and economic phenomena, both can be influenced by a common
hidden determinant, as, for example, geography in terms of distance from the
coast, climate and so on (Gallup et al., 1998). In general, cultural
explanations suffer from the endemic problem of potential misspecification and
hidden determinants.
The
analytical issues become even more complex, however, when we begin to ask for
the deeper reasons why there are policy differences or how geography works,
because we might go a full circle just back to culture again: geography, for
example, is relevant for economic phenomena only via human action, and for explaining
societal responses to the challenges posed by certain topographical features we
need to explain institutions and behavior, hence may be compelled to
re-introduce „culture“ just after having discarded it.[2]
Hence we cannot but note that in the first step „culture“ is indeed a measure
of our ignorance, however since our ignorance is overwhelming indeed, we cannot
do without the concept.
Culture, a disenabling force
Another
motivation for the use of culture in economic analyses is the experience of the
incapacity to control and steer institutional changes. This is of course
concomitant to the problem of ignorance, but special attention should be paid
to the possible incapacity to define certain models of change and to adopt
these models intentionally under other circumstances. A conspicious example is
the long-standing debate over the presumed „Otherness“ of Japan in the areas of
industrial policy and enterprise organization. Many observers argued that there
are special cultural determinants in the modes of interaction between
bureaucracy and companies as well as between suppliers and producers. However,
unless these cultural factors cannot be imitated outside Japan, the majority
would conclude that although there might be some specific historical causes of
the emergence of those patterns of interaction, the very fact of controlled
imitation demonstrates that under present circumstances there is no longer any
persisting cultural impact.
In
search of a definition of culture, hence we might begin with describing
“culture” as something that we cannot fully understand and utilize, even though
we experience its influence. Just because we experience such a diffuse feeling
of „resistance“ in real world institutions and systems, we are inclined to
attribute cultural properties to our object of research. As a matter of fact,
most users of the concept assume that culture is something objectively given
that could be possibly described and explained by the scientific observer.
Culture is a „thing“ in the sense of being a cause of certain effects that we
can observe.[3]
Culture, a thing in many disguises
Precisely
in that sense the concept is applied within many different settings, even if
culture is not attributed the primordial role in the respective theories. One
of the most intriguing cases is the frenzy with which theorists have recently
discussed the concept of „social capital“ (for a comprehensive overview, see Dasgupta/Serageldin,
1999).[4]
In a similar fashion like culture, social capital is used to explain something
that we do not fully understand, namely the reasons for the diverging economic
performance of different countries and regions, of different groups and
peoples. Given the difficulties in defining social capital, culture turns out
to be adduced in two different ways. First, when distinguishing between networks
and informal institutions in the analysis of social capital, culture might
refer to the underlying values and beliefs, hence cognitive phenomena in the
most general meaning of the term.[5]
Second, culture may denote the entire pattern of social capital, institutions
and values, hence in fact denotes the individuality of the single case. The
latter use, of course, does only make sense if there is something to anchor the
empirical reference. Most frequently this is achieved by means of constructing
a historical sequence leading from historical accounts of the societies in
question to their contemporary situation. Here, the uniqueness culture is
intimately linked to the singularity of history.[6]
It is
revealing to observe that there are many uses of culture in the analysis of
economic systems and institutions, but the majority of researchers do not
establish a full-scale cultural theory. As in the example of social capital,
culture is treated almost en passant, sometimes implying that we all understand
what culture means so that a short mentioning suffices to get the point.[7]
As a result, there is neither a clear definition of culture nor even a hint at
a workable empirical approach. In particular, economists prefer to use concepts
like “informal institutions” which seem to be closer to established fields of
research like game theory or institutional economics. Yet, they also mention
culture without explaining neatly the analytical distinction between both concepts.[8]
The same is true for the relation between concepts like „mental models“ and
culture.
Redefining culture
In this
paper, I wish to propose a radical solution for the conceptual muddle we have
met so far. The cause underlying the problems seems to be that culture is
somehow reified without at the same time providing a clear picture about that
“thing”. My approach is to take the obvious correlation between our ignorance
and the recourse to culture at face value. I am going to treat culture as a
property of the observer, not of her object. Or, more exactly, culture has to be conceived of as an
emerging property of the relation between observer and observed. Culture does not exist as a property unless
there is an observer. Hence, without analyzing the observer, we cannot access
culture.[9]
From
that perspective, there is a clear reason why ignorance and culture are so
closely related. Culture denotes those aspects of our field of observation that
are singular in nature (on the following, see Herrmann-Pillath, 2000, chpt. 2).
By definition, singular properties cannot be described by general propositions
but have to be identified by singular terms. However, we cannot make any
general statement about which features of reality might be truly singular or
not. Therefore, singular properties can only be identified in relation to a
particular observer who is not able to put forward a description in general
propositions. In abstract terms, this matches well the attitudes of observers,
for example, of the Japanese firm. As long as they are not able to provide a general
explanation for certain properties of the J-firm, they regard this as a
cultural phenomenon. In the moment when they are able to produce such a
generalized description, and if they are even able to translate this into
effective managerial advice to other firms, the cultural features of that case
whither away.
Treating
culture as an emergent property of the relation between observer and observed
adds considerably complexities to the use of the concept because we need to
distinguish between theoretical modes of observation and participant behavioral
modes. Since there can be a strong interaction between these different modes,
culture turns out to be a fuzzy and dizzy idea by necessity, and not by lack of
analytical rigour. However, our gain results into being able to avoid the many
pitfalls of cultural arguments in economic analysis.
2.
How to disentangle culture
Culture
is used in a sloppy, incomprehensively naive way in most of its applications in
economics. Here, suffice to mention some examples (for a more extensive
treatment, see Herrmann-Pillath, 1999). Very often culture and „society“ or
„nation“ are related, as in the expression „Chinese culture“, without
considering the issue of distinguishing between group-specific cultures or
regional cultures within a country.[10]
In other cases, culture is referred to history without making the causal
mechanism explicit that links certain historical patterns with present
phenomena. There is no clear foundation of the concept in behavioral analyses.[11]
Economists who introduce the concept mostly shun the explicit consideration how
this idea can be integrated into the basic behavioral model of economics
without leading into severe contradictions.[12]
Finally, culture is treated as a cause, yet we are not offered any convincing
approach how to identify that cause by quantitative and/or qualitative measures
and descriptions.[13]
Furthermore, an intriguing observation is the fact that economists mostly
develop independent approaches to culture. Seemingly, there are even barriers
against adopting approaches used in Management Sciences, not to speak about
disciplines like social psychology or anthropology.[14]
Considering
these fault lines, it is all too obvious that the use of the concept of culture
is ridden by fads and fashions. In particular, if economists feel certain about
their explanations, they will avoid the concept, only to unbury it after a
while of feeling ignorant when tackling a special case. In the theory of
economic systems this attitude can be readily observed after a “surprising”
model has collapsed. In theory, socialism presupposed a “new man” imbued with
impartial and altruistic motivation, and the East Asian model assumed men
deeply influenced by a sort of vernacular Confucianism. In both cases, the
recent eruptions were interpreted as a sign of a universal convergence of
institutions and values, hence culture: The “end of history” would also be the
“end of culture”.
In
redesigning the concept of culture, we start out with the problem of
distinguishing analytically between culture, cognition and institutions.
2.1
Separating culture analytically from
cognition and institutions
Perhaps
one of the theoretically most respectable arguments on culture is found in the
recent upsurge of cognitive science approaches in economics (for a collection
of contributions, see Streit et al. 1997). Here, culture is equated with sets
of cognitive schemes that enable economic agents to economize on information,
to systematicize otherwise chaotic perceptions and to learn in uncertain environments.
Therefore, the concept of culture becomes a necessary complement to the
rejection of the standard economic assumptions on perfect rationality and
complete information. Culture is deemed to be a response to uncertainty,
especially in social interaction. The crucial ingredient of this approach lies
in the definition of culture as „shared meanings“, that is to say, culture
refers to cognitive schemes that are common to a group of people, and not only
to a single person.[15]
Sharedness and level of aggregation
From
that point of view, culture can be a property of two people as well as of any
other larger group. However, since culture is also used as a distinctive
feature separating different groups, the concept cannot refer to the largest
possible group, i.e. mankind, as far as synchronic analysis is concerned. In
that case we would speak of a „human universal“, yet if we turn to diachronic
analysis we might even speak of a “global modern culture” as compared to other
large groups in the past.[16]
But independent from the question of maximum scale, the question may be raised
what the appropriate level of aggregation is in order to make a sensible use of
„culture“ possible. Indeed, there is the usage of concepts like „corporate
culture“ aside of „national culture“ and many other possible references.
Whereas
the problem of appropriate aggregation may be treated as an issue of
convention, the criterion of sharedness is not innocuous. Following
Wittgenstein’s (1958) decisive verdict against the possibility of private
languages, we have to conclude that there cannot be such a thing like “meaning
that is not shared” because otherwise their would be no anchor stabilizing the
frame of reference. If that is accepted, cognitive schemes and culture have to
be conflated by necessity: There is either a set of universal cognitive schemes
and no culture, or the different sets of cognitive schemes that reflect and
constitute different cultures. Thus, only the level of aggregation is left as a
possible criterion to distinguish between culture and cognition, if we stick to
the cognitive approach to culture.[17]
In other words, if we reject the standard economic concept of rationality and
if instead we adopt a more complex view of cognitive schemes, cognition proper
turns out as a cultural phenomenon. This conclusion lends some plausibility to
arguments that would restrict a „cultural sphere“ to a certain field different
e.g. from religion, ethics and others. However, most users of the concept
include all those different fields into the semantic reach of „culture“ (e.g.
Rosenbaum, 1999).
Beyond cognition and institutions: culture as a pattern
Therefore,
basing the concept of culture on the concept of cognitive schemes raises more
questions as it resolves. Aside from focusing on a particular level of
aggregation one way out of the conundrum is to define culture as the peculiar pattern of a manifold of cognitive schemes
(for related view, see DiMaggio, 1997). This would assign the cognitive schemes
to a position somewhat similar to „memes“, that is to say, schemes would be
conceived of as non-reducible building blocks of cognition, and cultures would
be defined according to the structure of the „molecule“ built out of these
„atoms“.[18] Culture
would be an emergent phenomenon of cognition, and could not be treated as being
a cognitive scheme itself. One can even imagine that there is a universal set
of cognitive schemes which can be arranged into a manifold of patterns.[19]
Only the patterns are culture specific.
Before
continuing this thread of the argument, we need to clarify another misplaced
mix of categories. The other promising candidate for defining culture is the
concept of informal institutions. In many uses, both concepts are used
interchangeably and with fuzzy semantic borderlines. I cannot delve into the
details here, but clearly culture must be something separate from informal
institutions. We could replicate the argument produced before and assign
culture to the function of denoting an ordered pattern of a manifold of
informal institutions. In that case, both concepts would be clearly separated
from each other since reference is established on different levels.
However,
many scholars would not accept a mutually exclusive relation between informal
institutions and culture because formal institutions bear the stamp of culture,
too, like in the case of legal traditions.[20]
That means, the many troubles with distinguishing neatly between formal and
informal institutions would also affect the use of the concept of culture. If
formal institutions are defined according to the criterion of being written
rules that are sanctioned by formal organizations, precisely that criterion is
in turn dependent on culture in the common usage of that term. For example,
many economists treat the family as an example of an informal institution, but
then what to do with kinship organizations based on written charters? Indeed,
on closer scrutiny, the distinction between formal and informal institutions is
tantamount to a very specific theory of modernization where the legal codes and
styles of government organization peculiar to Western societies are conceived
as yardsticks in order to fix the difference.
Yet,
the real analytical mess is reached if we follow the practice adopted by many
scholars who introduce informal institutions and cognitive schemes
simultaneously. Evidently, this approach would only make sense if we were able
to distinguish clearly between external institutions and internalized beliefs,
values and cognitive procedures. In fact, the concept of informal institutions
can only be used in an exact way if we stick to the standard idea of
rationality. In that case, we can explain the emergence and stability of
informal institutions by referring to certain incentives and rational
decisions. But in the moment when we introduce cognitive schemes that are not
universal to every human agent, we face the problem that we could no longer
compare the effects of incentives because these effects depend on the peculiar
way how incentives are perceived. Radically speaking, with non-universal
cognitive schemes there are no longer any institutions, because all the
institutions do only exist as certain cognitive regularities having systematic
behavioral effects.[21]
We may conclude, hence, that in the study of culture we need to vote for either
informal institutions or cognitive schemes, but never for both. Of course, this
argument is analogous to the standard methodological defense of universally
stable and identical preferences in economics which emphasizes the need to
establish a clear and unequivocal separation between environment and decision.
The hermeneutical trap: Perceiving patterns
Nevertheless,
a clear vote may not finally settle our problems with culture. If we go back to
our attempt at referring to culture as an emergent pattern of a manifold of
either cognitive schemes or informal institutions, the question arises how we
define such a pattern. This, of course, is a problem of cognition proper. In
either approaches we have to introduce the fundamental distinction between
outside observer and inside observer. Who perceives the pattern? How does a
pattern influence behavior via its constituents?
These
are very intricate issues indeed, because pattern recognition is, after all, a
cognitive act so that there is a fundamental problem of self-reference. If we
introduce culture as a theoretical term, we would need to set up a frame of
reference for identifying patterns empirically. There is no necessary
implication that those patterns are recognized by the agents who act under
their influence (just as we do not need to know about the workings of our
stomach in order to eat). But this seems to fly in the face of most common uses
of the concept where we meet the implicit presumption that people know about
their culture (althoughj they might not know about its function). On the other
hand, we may assume that behavior reflects culture just because people realize
the patterns and act accordingly by more or less conscious choice. In that case
we would have to reconstruct the perception of the inside agents before
developing an independent scientific view of cultural phenomena.[22]
Obviously,
there is now a real danger of running into the traps of hermeneutical circles
because if patterns are being perceived, their processing is a cognitive
phenomenon, too, and hence if culture is a pattern of cognitive schemes,
perception of culture is dependent on culture. A careful consideration of this
conclusion demonstrates, that we can free ourselves out of that trap if we
approach culture as a dynamic phenomenon, and if we analyze the process of
observing culture. We briefly consider two exemplary approaches in some more
detail which are directly relevant to economic analysis.
Culture and the perception of the self in social space
Let us
introduce the general idea that people posite themselves in a perceived social
space and try to guide their behavior to a certain degree according to the
expectations of others (Bernheim, 1994). This does by no means contradict
standard economic concepts of utility maximization because our self-esteem
certainly can be treated as a preference and contributes to our well-being.
Hence we might assume a universal human preference for a certain social respect
extended by others. However, as Kuran (1995) has demonstrated convincingly,
such kind of preference set introduces complex interactions between the
individual and the aggregate collective level of behavior. The reason is
straightforward: actual individual behavior becomes frequency-dependent.[23]
In Kuran’s approach, the distinction is introduced between individual private
preferences, publicly revealed preferences and actual distribution of behavior
in a collective. For example, an individual might prefer a certain behavior but
does not opt for a realization because this would deviate considerably from the
observed behavioral norm in the collective. Therefore, she demonstrates another
preference for the sole purpose to enjoy social reputation. That means, there
is a trade-off between utility gains from following one’s true private
preference and the gains reaped from social reputation by means of publicly displayed
preferences. Since that trade-off depends on the observed frequency of a
certain behavior in the collective, even small changes in that distribution
might trigger sudden and disruptive changes in individual behavior which feed
back to the overall distribution, eventually unravelling the formely deeply
entrenched pattern.
Kuran’s
deceptively simple argument in fact uncovers a fundamental difficulty in
observing culture. The outside observer in many cases does not have direct
access to private preferences, so that he does not know the degree how deep an
observed pattern is actually rooted in individual values and cognitive
processes. In fact, there need not exist any fundamental differences among the
individuals since even slight deviations among individual preferences can
cumulatively lead to large differences in collective behavior.[24]
If we decide to call this collective pattern „culture“, the concept would no
longer be related to cognition but only to an external effect of the complex
dynamics of social preference articulation. Empirically, the consequence is
that there need not exist a direct mapping between collective patterns and
individual patterns, so that search for peculiar values and cognitive schemes
would be futile. Obviously, this mechanism is very important for the analysis
of economic systems. For example, societies may be corrupt because people
perceive a certain degree of corruption that is beyond the threshold value
stabilizing a low-corruption equilibrium of the frequency-dependent process.
There would be no need to refer to internalized values fostering corruption like
nepotism.
On the
other hand, explaining the emergence of collective patterns is still based on a
special assumption about the workings of human self-perception and hence on a
cognitive phenomenon. In particular, although the pattern emerges as an phenomenon
external to the individuals, the patterns causes behavioral changes which are
channeled though the internal cognitive mechanisms of the individuals. This
entails another paradox and obstacle in turning culture into a definitive
concept: The trade-off between following one’s own way or the way of others can
be culturally specific, too. Actually, we do observe different degrees of
conformity and diverging opportunities for individual expression in different
societies: Formally, that means that the position of threshold values in
frequency-dependent processes might be dependent on culture as cognition. But
this leads into an infinite regress crystallizing in the paradox of conforming
to standards of conformity. Hence we are back with our original challenge.
Culture and social learning
Closely
related to the phenomenon of self-perception is the process of learning from
the behavior of others. If we start out from the reasonable assumption that
individuals are never perfectly informed, we have to pay attention to the fact
that they learn from observing the choices of others (Bhikchandi et al., 1992,
1997).[25]
Similar to the complexities involved in Kuran’s approach, this process can
display complex and multifarious dynamics. Yet the basic argument is simple
again. Assume, for example, that we suffer from a lack of information regarding
choice among certain alternatives, although we did accumulate personal
experience. We may decide to observe the behavior of others, although we cannot
observe their personal experience directly. In that case, we might decide
against our own best knowledge if we are inclined to believe that the decisions
of others are based on good reason and some better information. The crucial
point in that story is that if a chain of decisions is analyzed, even slight
deviations from private knowledge in single cases can change collective
behavior, because the distribution of choices in the observed collective
changes. The outcome of such a process depends critically on the specific way
how information is accessible to the individuals and how information is
transmitted in society.
Again,
as outside observers we can treat this actually observed collective pattern as
culture. In particular, we are inclined to talk about „culture“ if we feel to
be better informed about the respective choices than the participant agents.
For example, if we observe a certain women’s fashion that is definitively
harmful to health, we call this a cultural phenomenon, but if we were convinced
about its usefulness we would talk about its practical reason. This example
shows that both the distinction between private and public preferences as well
as the choices based on observation can work together: If I am not sure how a
certain practice might affect my health, I may opt for following the herd,
which at the same time raises my self-esteem. Uncertainty regarding private
preferences therefore will increase the dynamic complexity of choices in a
social context.
Thus,
we can take up an argument that has been adduced frequently for moral norms in
relation to rational opportunism: Culture may be a low-cost phenomenon in the
sense that rational agents will follow the vagaries of herd behavior if they
feel highly uncertain about the consequences of behavioral alternatives, and if
there seem to be no high costs involved in opting for a specific alternative
(Kliemt, ). Both the scenarios dicussed before do not need any special
assumptions about cognitive schemes in order to produce collective phenomena
that the observer will denote as „culture“.
Yet, at
a closer look in the case of social learning, too, there are certain implicit
assumptions which lead us back to culture. For example, the accessibility of
private information of others might be determined by cultural standards
regulating communicative behavior, or the weights attached to the observation
of others might be culturally specific as in the case of “conformity” that we
discussed before. Hence, we cannot avoid to tackle the question whether such
cultural differences can be observed directly.
2.2 The
impossibility of measuring cultural distinctiveness
The
fundamental methodological question arises how to distinguish between
collective phenomena and culture in terms of “real” differences between the
individuals. There is a well-developed literature on this problem that is,
however, often neglected by economists, although intensively used by
researchers in international management studies. International value surveys in
social psychology try to develop survey schemes that can be used as a yardstick
in order to measure group related differences in attitudes and behavior. In
that context, culture is introduced as a separate determinant of psychological
features linked to social interaction.[26]
The dependence of measures of culture on culture
However,
although these efforts have been successful in identifying many aspects of
cultural distinctiveness, there are also strong indicators of an interaction
between observer and observed object that raise serious doubts whether we have
really „objective“ measures at hand. The most conspicious example so far is the
development of the famous and much-used Hofstede survey schemes. Hofstede’s
quantitative measures of cultural characteristics like
„individualism/collectivism“ or „uncertainty avoidance“ have been enlarged to
include a category of so-called „Confucian dynamism“ (see Hofstede, 1991). This
category was proposed because in East Asian attitudes toward time and social
obligation seem to be important for the peculiar „Asian“ cultural pattern to emerge
on the macrosociological and macroeconomic level. In questionnaire surveys,
East Asians seemed to be more inclined to pay attention to the long-run
consequences of action whereas Westerners seemed to be more short-term
oriented. One reason underlying this different performance was regarded to be a
different moral attitude linked to Confucianism.
This
change of the structure of the survey demonstrates how the very yardstick for
the assessment of cultural differerences is endogenous to culture, too. There
is no compelling reason why, for example, there could not exist a special
category specific to Islamic peoples or African ones. The only explanation for
the single inclusion of a „Confucian“ category is that Hofstede and other
researchers simply did not pay attention to those groups because they are not
as conspicious in the international economic arena as East Asians: success
breeds theoretical curiosity: culture as surprising event. When defining survey
questions and frames of reference, there is the problem that the questions
proper can be dependent on the specific cultural background. In the context of
Chinese value surveys, for example, researchers argued that a special value of
„piety“ should be included which is meaningful for every Chinese, yet difficult
to understand for Westerners (Ho, 1996). If researchers start to construct
indirect questions that might serve as a test for identifying the impact of
piety, there is no way to separate the interpretation of scenarios from the
actual response. That is to say, perceptions of questions and outcomes in terms
of replies are difficult, if impossible to disentangle.[27]
It is
illuminating to observe that on the one hand research therefore led to the
claims of establishing „indigenous psychologies“ of cultures, and that on the
other hand the idea of modularization of values and behavioral patterns emerged
(Yang, 1996). That means, cultural analysis cannot do without culturally
specific analytical categories, so that eventually no universal frame of
reference can be set up which allows a uni-dimensional comparison of cultures,
not to speak about anything approaching quantitative measurement. At the same
time, during the process of modernization culture dissolves into many elements
that can be rearranged even on the individual level in order to produce many
variants. For example, there can be a certain set of values in the professional
life of an individual and another one in family life, where the former is
highly „Westernized“ and the latter more traditional. Researchers would need to
switch between perspectives in order to be able to grasp the meaning of such
modular life styles. In post-modern individualism, this fact has been made a
program for designing “life styles”.[28]
These
sketchy thoughts only serve to demonstrate the fundamental methodological point
that the observation and measurement of culture is not independent from
culture. We do not wish to assess the positive conclusions regarding
modernization, convergence of cultures and so on. Here we may be satisfied with
the result that there is no objective measure possible. This can lead us
eventually to reject the entire concept as not being amenable to scientific
analysis, if we regard quantification and measurable causality as the bread and
butter of serious research.[29]
The “black box” approach to culture
In
spite of that methodological nihilism, we can go back to the starting point of
this paper. Even if we cannot identify the impact of culture directly, we could
still claim that we observe its effects on the level of kinds of data which are
completely independent from cultural categories. In that regard, the example
mentioned in the first paragraphs of this paper, namely the divergent
transition experience, is a very difficult one to analyze because effects and
causes cannot be separated in a clear fashion. If institutions are the central
intermediating variable for explaining performance, culture and institutions
would need to be distinguished already before empirical analysis could be
started in a meaningful fashion. Since institutions are not independent from
culture, analytical problems cannot be circumvented.
However,
there seem to exist analytically much less demanding cases. One example can be
found in the analysis of international trade and investment where many
investigations have been realized in order to understand the direction and
sequence of international transactions. Again, there is a clear difference
between the attitudes of trade theorists in the narrow meaning and researchers
in international business studies. Whereas the latter focused very early on the
possible impact of „psychic distance“ on international transactions, the former
hit upon related determinants only after a failure to apply core analytical
categories like relative factor abundance on trade data. One of the most
conspicious examples is the recent controversy over the impact of national
borders on trade which began with the observation that neither does
U.S.-Candian trade match the expectations derived from gravity equations nor
does the law of one price work satisfactorily in its context.[30]
The strength of the invisible determinants is the real surprise in that
econometric work. For example, in a gravity approach based on states/provinces
data there would be a very clear predominance of the North-South axis over the
East-West axis in U.S. and Canadian international and domestic trade, but in
fact one can observe just the opposite.
In our
context, the surprising observation is that trade analysts do not refer to
culture as a possible systematic determinant, given that fact that there are no
substantial other barriers to trade. There are many results from disciplines
other than economics that have proven how culturally distinct Americans and
Canadians perceive themselves. In assessing that literature we would be back to
our former problems in understanding culture via direct observation. Indeed,
whereas political scientist Lipset (1987) emphasizes substantial differences in
terms of values also with reference to the economy (e.g. regarding government
intervention), in Hofstede‘s investigations Americans and Canadians seem to be
very close to each other. However, since trade data can be interpreted easily
and unequivocally, we may assume that here we have a proof of cultural distinctiveness,
since most other possible determinants can be controlled almost like in an
experiment. This is a clear case of the “black box” approach to culture – or is
it?
Unfortunately,
matters are not that easy. If we try to refer to observable data exclusively,
we cannot differentiate between the impact of culture and the impact of
knowledge about culture as opposed to other possible determinants of behavior.
The argument is as simple as that: Imagine two groups with highly divergent cultures.
In spite of the differences, both groups invest a lot of effort into mutual
understanding so that eventually they are able to deal smoothly and efficiently
with each other. That means, they successfully established a transcultural
framework for transactions. In that case, observers would never discern any
cultural impact on transactions even though cultural differences continue to be
pronounced. So applying the “black box” approach presupposes a specification of
the state of knowledge of the economic agents.
As a
matter of fact, this problem has been investigated into in the case of
U.S.-Canadian economic relations. As Engel/Rogers (1998) have demonstrated
theoretically for the law of one price, there can be persisting deviations if
two countries have separate retail distribution systems where competitors
cannot enter the other market, for example, because of high sunk cost of entry.
Interestingly, there is some empirical research in the cross-national retail
sector starting out from the observation that U.S. retailers are pretty
successful in Canada but not vice versa (O’Grady/Lane, 1996). Questionnaire
surveys have led to the hypothesis that there are cultural causes of that
phenomenon, but most decisive seems to be the degree of knowledge about the cultural
differences. Canadian retailers were not successful if they started out from
the belief that everything is similar in the U.S. as in Canada, just because
they believed that both societies are similar. Because of high learning costs,
many of them were not successful. Yet, if retailers prepare well, there is a
much higher probability of successful entry. O’Grady and Lane call this
observation the „psychic distance paradox“. In the U.S.-Canadian case, small
cultural differences were multiplied because of a lack of information about
them.[31] On the other hand, performance could be
better even in the case of large psychic distance because people invest a lot
into being well prepared. However, this observation would not justify the
conclusion that there are few cultural differences.
Therefore,
we may conclude this section of the paper with the general statement that there
is no conclusive method to distinguish analytically between culture and
knowledge about culture on the basis of observable data. As long as the “black
box” is not opened, the degrees of freedom are too large in order to be able to
identify a single cause of the observed data.[32]
But is we open the “black box”, we are back with all the difficulties with
observing culture directly that we touched upon in former sections.
3.
Escape from the cultural conundrum: understanding the observation of culture
The
arguments presented so far give the impression that culture might exist, but
there is an indeterminancy problem: If we try to get hold of it, culture
transforms itself and we cannot but return to the beginning. Culture is a
paradoxical concept because perceiving culture is a cultural process for its
part.[33]
I think
that all these problems result from the misplaced assumption that culture is a
property of our object of research. If culture is indeed not independent from
the very process of observing culture, this starting point might be highly
misleading. Instead, we may assume that culture is a property of the observer,
or, more exactly, of the relation between observer and observed. This fits well
to both the cognitive and the rational approach sketched above, since in both
cases we referred culture to a pattern on a level above the constituent causes.
For example, cognitive schemes are not „culture“, but presumably ordered
patterns of schemes are “culture”. But then it follows immediately that these
patterns can only be accessed via understanding the process of perceiving the
patterns. Hence, the fundamental question has to be raised. Who observes and
how?[34]
Looking into the mirror of culture
Subsequently,
I wish to present the basic approach toward a new understanding of the role of
culture in economic analysis. We start out from the basic triangle linking
culture, behavior and institutions (fig. one), where we depict the general
presumption that institutions and behavior are both embedded into culture. This
reflects the fundamental problem how to distinguish between internalized values
and incentives resulting from informal institutions. We do not assume a
feedback loop to culture because this is a basic methodological premise in
order to make sense of cause and effect. Otherwise, the triangle would simple
collapse into one single concept of distinctiveness (individuality,
singularity). This methodological starting point can be legitimized, for
example, by referring to the distinction between different degrees of speed of
change. If culture is defined as the determinant that changes with the least
speed, the triangle would simply refer to certain time period that is shorter than
the implicit time unit of cultural changes.
Figure one: The cultural triangle
Between
institutions and behavior, we assume a mutual causation similar to the scenario
discussed in section 2. For example, in the Kuran framework we can observe a
stable pattern of interactions (e.g. a religious ritual) that we treat as an
institution, yet some changes of perception on part on the agents might trigger
a sudden change of that institution.
The
four forms of causality implied in figure one are related to basic analytical
categories in the social sciences, i.e.:
institutions influence behavior via
incentives/sanctions
behavior influences institutions via
utility/interest
culture influences behavior via values/symbols
culture influences institutions via
history/ideologies
Now we
proceed with the simple assumption that „culture“ is introduced as a hypothesis
of the observer trying to explain certain patterns on the level of institutions
and behavior. Immediately we realize that there are different observers which
are relevant for our analysis, if we distinguish between the two sides of the
culture in question and its outside observer. If we take the Canadian example
with reference to U.S. culture, then we distinguish:
The outside scientific observer – the trade
theorist
The outside participant observer – Canadian
retailers entering U.S. market
The inside learned observer – U.S. academics
reflecting upon U.S. culture
The inside participant observers – domestic
U.S. competitors of Canadian retailers
Each of
the four groups observes the cultural triangle and may develop its own view of
the interactions among the three constituents of the triangle.
In
figure two, we analyze a subset of the possible interactions resulting from the
fact that the four groups might communicate their views to each other or may
get access to those views otherwise. This process takes place in the „mirror of
culture“. The crucial point is that none of the four groups is able to identify
the true workings of the triangle unless one was perfectly informed. If there
is no a priori privileged position including science, culture can only be
identified via the complex interaction of the different processes of observing
the triangle. We might say that culture emerges as an observational category
and can be described in more detail in observing the entire interaction taking
place in the mirror of culture. This is visualized in figure two by means of
introducing a second level scientific observer who analyzes the first level
processes. Of course, this second level observation is facing logical and
methodological problems similar to those on the first level. Hence the core
question results to be how the second level process can be designed differently
from the first level process in order to be able to find another way out of the
cultural conundrum.
Figure 2: The mirror of culture
Let us
briefly explain the different interactions according to the numbers assigned to
the arrows.
(1)
In the
anthropological terminology this is the etic approach to the triangle. The
outside scientific observer tries to explain the triangle according to
universal categories. This is, for example, the Hofstede approach insofar as
the questionnaires are not regarded as being culturally specific and the
replies are simply processed quantitatively. The traditional economic approach
to the analysis of individual choice is etic, too, insofar as preferences are
regarded as being universal, stable and identical, and insofar as the
observation of alternatives is not dependent on the position of the observer.[35]
(2)
Opposed
to etic analysis is the emic approach. There are different alternatives, yet
here we only refer to the explicit consideration of inside learned analysis in
outside reconstructions of culture. This method is used frequently in the
macro-analysis of economic systems, as when the „Confucian hypothesis“ is
adduced in order to explain high growth rates in East Asia. Researchers mostly
refer to inside descriptions of Confucian values e.g. according to
Neo-Confucian thinkers and view at the triangle through that lense. As is well
known, in that case etic analysis may cast doubt on the emic understanding when
Neo-Confucian ideology is explained as merely reflecting political interests of
the dominant classes, where “interests” are treated as human universals (power,
wealth etc.).
(3)
The
two alternatives mentioned before are mostly the only aspects in the mirror of
culture which are made explicit in the debate on cultural issues in economic
systems analysis. In contrast, we proceed with alternative 3 where the view of
the outside observer is used by the inside learned observer in order to
understand the triangle. Obviously, there is now the problem that the outside
view can be either emic or etic. In the first case, there is the phenomenon of
„inverse orientalism“, that means for example, Western views of the „Otherness
of Japan“ are imported into Japanese scholarly works which are subsequently
re-imported into the West (cf. Befu/Kreiner, 1992). In the second case, inside
obervers might use the „enlightenment“ of scientific criticism to unmask
ideological uses of culture in their own society. One of the foremost examples
is Marxist analysis of the substructure/superstructure dualism, which simultaneously
demonstrates that the outside scientific observer might not stay in an
epistemologically advantaged position.
(4)
Of
course, the inside learned observer develops her own view of the triangle. This
is the so-called „indigenous“ perspective that we touched upon in the preceding
section. There are radical statements of this position which argue that there
can never be a full understanding of culture on side of the outside observer
because he has not grown up inside that culture. As we see, this perspective
can display a large variety of views reaching e.g. from indigenous scientific
approaches to religious explanations of the triangle. In the latter case, there
might even be no independent concept of „culture“, because a religious
foundation of the institution-behavior complex is regarded to be based on
absolute truths and absolute values.[36]
(5)
We
turn to the participant outside observer, for example the businesswoman doing
business in the foreign country. She develops her own understanding of the
triangle, mostly supported by information obtainable in special journals,
conversations with colleagues in hotel lobbies or training seminars. From the
viewpoint of the scientific observer, here we frequently meet prejudices and
stereotypes that serve to structure interactions and reduce uncertainty in
spite of having no firm empirical foundation. Yet, these perceptions are
important for our topic because they determine the actual transactions so that
any measurement being based on scientifically created categories might be
completely misleading. For example, if the Chinese were being proven to be very
similar to the Japanese according to a certain standard value assessment
procedure, this would not imply that interactions run smoothly because
interaction is determined by the mutual perception of differences. If people
believe that they are different, thus they are. This observation raises serious
doubts about every approach to culture that compares cultures in isolation.
(6)
The
outside participant observer might rely on scholarly advice when trying to
understand the triangle. This advice, in turn, depends on whether the emic or
the etic approach is chosen. There can be very complex ramifications, as for
example, if reverse orientalism is fed back into a self-image of the inside
learned observer that is afterwards translated back into some work of outside
colleagues which is then processed in popular introductions into foreign
cultures. A concrete example can be found in the indirect impact of sojourning
scholars on the popular images of foreign cultures. Cultural mediators living
in foreign countries sometimes enjoy the reputation of authenticity, although
they actually create images of culture which are already adaptated to the
foreign audience, albeit often unconsciously.
(7)
Symmetrically,
the inside observer perceives his own way of living in assigning certain
functions to the different aspects of the triangle. Here we also observe
stereotypes e.g. of national and regional identity. These are important insofar
as stereotypes determine actual behavior. In particular, on both the outside
and the inside the problem of mutual seperateness is involved which strongly
affects personal identity. That is to say, even if there is no other clearly
discernible reason why the groups are different, the mere cause of creating
identity may suffice to stabilize stereotypes (cf. Smith/Bond, 1993, pp.
77ff.). The inside perspective is also important for the generation of
subcultures which are then fit into the moulds of the larger group identity.
For example, disadvantaged groups might assign a certain role to themselves
which at the same time legitimizes deprivation and provides an identity in
terms of belonging to the larger group.
(8)
Inside
self-perception can be mediated via the learned opinions of inside observers.
For example, participant observers might view their own position according to
religious views propagated by an intellectual elite. We have to note that both
perspectives can differ, as in Kuran’s approach in explaining e.g. the Indian
caste system. There can be a complex mix of perspectives in the way how a
low-caste member views the mechanism how he is assigned to his position.
Private views (7) can differ from public views (8), however adopting the latter
may not simply be straigthforward social deceit, but may be deeply related to
identity issues as explained in the former paragraph.
(9)
The
outside participating observer can adopt the viewpoint of the inside observer.
This process is commonly known as cultural assimilation and regarded as a
problem not only in international management but also anthropology, provided that
the outside observer is no longer able to detach himself from that perspective.
Again, there are complex ramifications possible. For example, the process of
assimilation can be influenced by the fact that the participant inside observer
adopts (8) and that the learned inside observer adopts (3). If at the same time
the outside scientific observer follows (2), then we confront a
self-perpetuating system where everybody seems to agree on a certain image of
culture where we cannot determine the exact point of origin.
(10) The same can be said for the
opposite direction. An interesting case in point are cross-cultural marriages
which frequently suffer from problems of mutual understanding, in particular if
contexts become specific to one of the sides of the relationship. However, the
interaction of (9) and (10) can be interpreted as the emergence of a highly
specific interactive “micro-metaculture” of the relation in which both sides
consciously assign certain places and function for perceived cultural
differences (Smith/Bond, 1993, p. 202f.).
We do
not continue with the analysis of the mirror of culture, although there are
important interactions left out of the picture, as for example the question how
inside learned observers try to understand the viewpoint of inside participant
observers. We pin down the result that in the mirror of culture there is no
fixpoint because we can shift between the perspectives and because those
perspectives can reflect other perspectives in a multi-faceted way. Culture is
a pure observational phenomenon without any direct relation to the object of observation.
Let us
now try to understand the way how culture can be analyzed and how this is
related to our research strategies in the study of economic systems.
Understanding economic systems through the mirror of culture
In the
mirror of culture, culture eventually emerges as a property of the complex
reflections between the different observers. Although perhaps all the observers
agree that there is a “thing” like culture in the triangle which they focus on,
they are not able to observe but what is emerging in the dazzling reflections
of the mirror of culture. On the level of scientific theorizing, we may say
that there is an ontological presumption on culture, but at the same time we
know that culture is a “Ding an sich” that we cannot approximate directly. In
terms of our problématique of understanding economic systems that means:
Although we are convinced that there is a cultural impact on their
institutional configuration and economic performance, we will never be able to
fix that impact unequivocally. This leads us back to the fundamental insight in
our introductory considerations where culture has been linked to the
singularity of economic systems. The singular cannot be explained via general
statements. In that sense, there is a ring of truth in statements like “Japan
is different”.[37]
However,
the mirror of culture nevertheless opens a way how to get hold of the effects
of that unaccessible thing of culture.[38]
We only need to accept the assumption that all the observers process certain
real-world experiences when acting in the context of the triangle. That is to
say, everybody receives some kind of information about the elephant, however
restricted, limited and indirect. Now, in the famous story about the four blind
men touching and describing the elephant, they can progress toward reality if
they start to communicate and try to reach some kind of mutual understanding
about the shape of the thing they are not able to watch in its totality. The
same can be imagined to happen among the four observers in the mirror of
culture.
The
only way how to get access to culture is to establish a systematic
communicative process where people exchange their views about culture. This is
akin to a process of translating and re-translating a piece of literature
between four different languages where finally there is no fixpoint left. Yet,
all the translators might nevertheless agree on a shared meaning of the text
although after a while there is no longer any authoritative source claiming to
offer the right meaning. In the same vein, culture may be the result of
reaching mutual understanding among the four observers in the mirror of
culture. However, the decisive step is the shift onto the next higher level of
scientific observation. This is already included in figure two with a second
outside mirror. Another position of the outside observer is introduced from
where the process of mutual communication about culture is observed for its
part. The possible consensus on culture is fixed here and described as the
final hypothesis about culture as a determinant of reality. Of course, the
process does not need to stop here because this result can be fed back onto the
lower level so that a new round is started. Furthermore, this detached position
can of course be adopted by any of the four observers.
There
are many practical approaches to the actual implementation of such a research
strategy in the study of economic systems. Perhaps this down-to-earth argument
may clarify my point in the best way (for a related recommendation, see
Lackner/Werner, 1999, pp. 49ff.). Take, for example, the assumption that there
is a cultural determinant (like moral attitudes toward loyality) of
supplier-producer relations in Japan, which are said to cause substantial
differences in economic performance and process. These differences are directly
relevant for policy matters because domestic competition policy as well as
external economic relations are affected through the special problems of market
access. Research design can be as follows.[39]
First, independent assessments of
supplier-producer relations are collected via documents and other approaches to
observation based on the respective isolated positions in the mirror of
culture. These can be, for example, foreign newspaper reports about the
problems of foreign firms accessing the Japanese market, or domestic accounts
on legal disputes between Japanese firms.
Second, a mixed Foreign-Japanese research team
is set up that conducts questionnaire surveys and interviews with foreign and
Japanese managers working in Japan. The purpose is to identify reasons and
perceptions of barriers to entry in supplier relationships.
Third, roundtable meetings on the same topic
are held among Japanese and foreign managers which are documented in order to
be processed afterwards by the research team.
Fourth, in a two step-procedure there are first
separate meetings among the foreign and the Japanese researchers and managers
respectively, which are followed by a concluding symposium with all the four
groups participating. The final result is an assessment of the impact of
culture on supplier-producer relations in Japan.
Fifth, this result as well as a detailed
description of the whole process of achieving the result is presented to an
independent researcher who tries to understand how cultural factors might have
influenced the way leading to that result.
Sixth, that result is fed back to the four
groups. They reflect about possible cultural impacts on the way how they agreed
upon culture.
As we
see, our abstract reasoning is easily amenable to feasible (alas, expensive)
research designs. Furthermore, another result can be that the foreign managers
learn to understand the supposed cultural determinant of supllier-producer
relations and hence are able to cope with that factor in a way so that it might
no longer be an impediment to entry. Just as we have mentioned in the context
of the U.S.-Canadian case, knowledge about culture may eventually neutralize
the impact of culture on economic processes without at the same time deleting
cultural features of behavior.
Of
course, the material input needed is much larger than in standard value
analyses, not to speak of armchair theorizing on culture based on a certain
knowledge about history. The study of economic systems would move very close to
economic anthropology as applied on industrialized societies. What we have
described is even a simple research design, because there would be a need for
parallel processes involving Japanese participants and systematically varying
participants from other countries: For example, a U.S.-Japanese research team
might implement the same project design as a German-Japanese team. Only after
the entire process would have been concluded, results would be put together and
compared.
4.
Conclusion
Economists
have turned their attention to concepts like values, norms, culture or
cognitive schemes in order to better understand the working and performance of economic
systems. However, as we have seen, there are strong epistemological and
methodological arguments against the assumption that culture can be observed
directly by any kind of “objective” instrument. The central thesis advanced in
this paper is this one: We are only able to observe culture by means of
observing the observation of culture. More exactly, the latter means that we
try to understand the approaches of observers of economic systems who believe
that there is something like “culture” working behind the phenomena which they
perceive more or less directly.
The
fundamental reason why this complex approach is necessary to fix culture
empirically lies in the fact that culture can be equated neither with values
nor cognitive schemes nor informal institutions. Culture is a pattern of these
hypothetical constituents. However, patterns do not exist without an observer
who perceives those patterns. This leads directly to our approach if we agree
that there is no primordial observer. Hence, we need to reflect upon the way
how different observers observe the pattern of culture, and we can establish
settings where we learn about culture via analyzing the way how those different
observers communicate their observations to each other.
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Zusammenfassung
In
den letzten Jahren wird der Begriff der „Kultur“ wieder vermehrt verwendet, um
Unterschiede in Institutionen und Leistung von Wirtschaftsordnungen zu
erklären. Gleichzeitig wird der Begriff zunehmend kognitionstheoretisch
fundiert. Bei näherer Betrachtung zeigt sich aber, daß im Rahmen einer Thematisierung
von kognitiven Modellen und/oder informalen Institutionen „Kultur“ entweder
eine redundante Kategorie ist, oder substantielle Paradoxa der
Selbstbezüglichkeit in der wissenschaftlichen Analyse auftreten. Dies gilt auch
für Versuche, „Kultur“ als „black box“ zu behandeln und nur „kulturfreie“ Daten
zu berücksichtigen (wie Außenhandelsdaten). Es wird daher vorgeschlagen, Kultur
als „Muster“ (von kognitiven Schemata oder informalen Institutionen) zu
behandeln, das keiner direkten Beobachtung zugänglich ist, sondern nur als
emergentes Phänomen der Beziehung zwischen Beobachter und Gegenstand, wie etwa
einer Wirtschaftsordnung. Anhand einer genaueren Betrachtung dieses Prozesses
der Beobachtung wird eine konkrete empirische Forschungsstrategie vorgeschlagen,
um Kultur als Hypothese des wissenschaftlichen Beobachters zu entwickeln, die
sich aus der Selbstbeobachtung ableitet.